This handbook examines what education would look like if it prepared gifted students to transform the world—to make it a better place for all, not just for those who receive extra resources from schools in return for being labeled as “gifted.” The editors explore how transformationally gifted people can seek to make the world a better and more just place: they try to make a positive, meaningful, and possibly enduring contribution to changing things in the world that are not working. (...) They do not view “giftedness” merely as a transaction whereby, in exchange for being labeled as “gifted,” they accrue benefits to themselves: such as a more prestigious education, more income, or residence in a more exclusive community. The overarching aim of this book is to present conceptions of what identification and instruction of the gifted would look like if the focus of gifted education was transformational rather than transactional. What if gifted education did not focus so much on acceleration vs. enrichment, or pull-out versus in-class integration, but rather on how to be gifted in giving back—in using one’s gifts to create a better world? (shrink)

The author reviews the contents of the ten articles by j l austin which appear in the volume "philosophical papers". She tries to "single out what is unique about his contribution, In particular what features of his procedure, Falling as it does under the general classification 'linguistic analysis', Were so distinctive as to win for it the attention accorded to a new departure." (staff).

The De officiis of Ambrose of Milan is one of the most important texts of Latin Patristic literature. Modelled on the De Officiis of Cicero, it sets out Ambrose's ethical vision for his clergy, synthesizing ancient Stoic assumptions on virtue and expediency with Biblical patterns of humility, charity, and self-denial to present a paradigm of a church hierarchy capable of making the right impact on its social world. Ambrose aspires to demonstrate that the age of profound principles (...) is now available.This new edition constitutes the first Modern English translation of Ambrose's Latin. The Text and Translation in Volume 1 are accompanied by a detailed Commentary that concentrates on Ambrose's debts to Cicero and his attempts to renovate his philosophical inheritance. An extensive Introduction analyses his ethical ideals and sets them in their social context. (shrink)

The De officiis of Ambrose of Milan is one of the most important texts of Latin Patristic literature. Modelled on the De Officiis of Cicero, it sets out Ambrose's ethical vision for his clergy, synthesizing ancient Stoic assumptions on virtue and expediency with Biblical patterns of humility, charity, and self-denial to present a paradigm of a church hierarchy capable of making the right impact on its social world. Ambrose aspires to demonstrate that the age of profound principles (...) is now available.This new edition constitutes the first Modern English translation of Ambrose's Latin. The Text and Translation in Volume 1 are accompanied by a detailed Commentary that concentrates on Ambrose's debts to Cicero and his attempts to renovate his philosophical inheritance. An extensive Introduction analyses his ethical ideals and sets them in their social context. (shrink)

Since Aristotle, the concept of the magnanimous or great-souled man was employed by philosophers of antiquity to describe individuals who attained the highest degree of virtue. Greatness of soul was part of the language of Classical and Hellenistic virtue theory central to the education of Ambrose and Augustine. Yet as bishops they were conscious of fundamental differences between Christian and pagan visions of virtue. Greatness of soul could not be appropriated whole cloth. Instead, the great-souled man had to be (...) baptized to conform with Christian understandings of righteousness, compassion, and humility. In this book, J. Warren Smith traces the development of the ideal of the great-souled man from Plato and Aristotle to latter adaptions by Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch. He then examines how Ambrose's and Augustine's theological commitments influenced their different critiques, appropriations, and modifications of the language of magnanimity. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume, appearing between the years 1939 and 1958, include all of the late Professor J. L. Austin's published papers, and in addition two unpublished papers, ‘The Meaning of a Word’ and ‘Unfair to Facts’, as well as an unscripted talk, ‘Performative Utterances’, given in the Third Programme of the B.B.C. in 1956. The editors, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, have performed a real service in making these papers available in one volume; for the (...) cumulative impact of the method Austin pursued in doing philosophy, and the questions this method raises, can be felt and appreciated more fully when a considerable assemblage of illustrative papers is brought together. The debt Austin owes to the tradition to which G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein contributed is quite clear, and the divergences from them are equally clear. In reviewing the contents of the ten articles in this volume I shall try to single out what is unique about his contribution, in particular what features of his procedure, falling as it does under the general classification ‘linguistic analysis’, were so distinctive as to win for it the attention accorded to a new departure. (shrink)

The De Officiis of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan is a key text of early Christian literature. Based on a work by the Roman writer, Cicero, it presents the first systematic account of Christian ethics. Volume 1 of this edition offers an introduction, the Latin text, and translation, whilst Volume 2 gives a full commentary. It is the first full-length study of Ambrose's work written in English in modern times.

Prolegomena : the ritual context for Ambrose's soteriology -- The case of Augustine's baptism -- The loss of harmonic unity : Ambrose's account of the fallen human condition -- The soul : Ambrose's true self -- Essential unity of soul and body : Ambrose's hylomorphic theory -- The body of death : the legacy of the fall -- Raised to new life : Ambrose's theology of baptism -- Baptism : sacrament of justification -- Resurrection and (...) regeneration -- Baptismal regeneration : participation in the new humanity -- The inner man's new desire -- Conclusion : the inner man's heavenly dwelling place. (shrink)

This chapter considers some of the philosophical writings of Alice Ambrose (1906–2001) and Margaret MacDonald (1903–1956), particularly in relation to their responses to Russell’s work. It argues that both need to be recovered and reconsidered as significant philosophers in their own right, who have important contributions to make to the familiar problems posed by ordinary language in relation to philosophy. Ambrose worked mainly in mathematics and symbolic logic and her earliest publications drew a critical response from Russell himself. (...) Responding in turn to the work of Russell, among others, she went on to bring clarity to the various ways in which ordinary language featured in contemporary philosophical discussion, and identified the centrality of ‘linguistic innovation’ to much philosophical practice. MacDonald found much to agree with in Russell’s work on analysis, but she, too, was troubled by his dismissive attitude to ordinary language. She argued that many philosophical problems can be solved by understanding how language is ordinarily used, and published her case before more celebrated ‘ordinary language philosophers’, most notably J. L. Austin. She also set out ideas and terminology which were later to be associated with Austin’s speech act theory in her contributions to ethics and aesthetics. Both Ambrose and MacDonald contributed to and extended the application of the study of ordinary language in analytic philosophy in ways which deserve to be recovered and to be subjected to further philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dharma Bums: The Beat Generation and the Making of Countercultural PilgrimageP. J. JohnstonI believe in the sweetness of Jesus And Buddha— I believe, In St. Francis, Avaloki Tesvara, the Saints Of First Century India A D And Scholars Santidevan And Otherwise Santayanan Everywhere.(Kerouac 1959: 15)Preliminary Polemics“PILGRIM, n. A traveler that is taken seriously.”—Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary 2007: 133As Beat commentator Stephen Prothero describes in his article “On (...) the Holy Road: The Beat Movement as Spiritual Protest” (1991), the Beats and their pilgrimages have most emphatically not been taken seriously. Both critics and scholars have been unkind to members of the Beat generation, and this unkindness has manifested itself in relative neglect of the Beats in all possible aspects of scholarly investigation. But nowhere does this appear more pronounced than in the area of Beat religion. Though some recent scholarship has been picking up from this earlier neglect and it is now [End Page 165] possible to find serious biographies of most of the major Beat writers and some belated attention to the movement as a literary phenomenon, the only book-length treatment of Beat Buddhism I was able to locate (Tonkinson 1995) hardly qualifies as a scholarly work and was published not by an academic press but as a special feature of the Buddhist magazine Tricycle. Prothero hypothesizes that this is because of the movement’s reputation as rebellious and antinomian—in its heyday the movement was characterized in identical unsavory terms by publications representing interests as diverse as Life and Playboy, with the latter describing the Beats as “nihilists” and the former claiming that the Beats were at war with “Mom, Dad, Politics, Marriage, the Savings Bank, Organized Religion, Literary Elegance, Law, the Ivy League Suit and Higher Education, to say nothing of the Automatic Dishwasher, the Cellophane-wrapped Soda Cracker, the Split-Level House and the clean, or peace-provoking H-bomb” (Prothero 1991: 206). Norman Podhoretz of Partisan Review went further still, claiming that the Beats were “hostile to civilization” and that the movement as a whole amounted to “a revolt of the spiritually underprivileged and crippled of soul” and “an affirmation of death” (ibid., 206). One couldn’t ask for a more passionate disavowal of the Beats or a more thorough polemic that the movement was profoundly antireligious.This could not contrast more with the Beats’ representation of their movement and its aims, with Jack Kerouac going so far as to reinterpret the crucial term “Beat” (a term for someone down and out originally borrowed from criminal street jive) as a noun derived from the adjective “beatific,” a specifically religious term familiar from such phrases as “the beatific vision” (ibid., 206–207). Several of the representative Beat writers were practicing Buddhists, influencing the entire movement to such an extent that Buddhist ideas and imagery suffused Beat literature as a whole. Ginsberg and Kerouac especially emphasized the positive and constructive elements of their spiritual vision, arguing that literature such as On the Road and Howl should be understood as religious affirmations of what is good and holy rather than as purely critical undertakings: “For the crucifix I speak out, for the Star of Israel I speak out, for the divinest man who ever lived who was German (Bach) I speak out, for sweet Mohammed I speak out, for Buddha I speak out, for Lao-tse and Chuang-tse I speak out” (ibid., 206–207). Or, as Allen Ginsberg put it less lyrically (and rather more bluntly): “Howl is an ‘Affirmation’ by individual experience of God, sex, drugs, and absurdity... the poems are religious and I meant them to be” (ibid., 207).But for the most part, Beat asseverations in no way diminished scholarly wariness about the Beat movement and its spirituality—as Prothero concludes, “the tendency among literary scholars is to see these [religious] concerns as tangential rather than constitutive” while “historians of American religion who have explored beat spirituality have tended to focus almost exclusively on the beats’ engagement with Zen and then to dismiss that engagement as haphazard” (ibid., 207).It is my contention that the mainstream scholarly neglect of Beat spirituality is in some part... (shrink)

This admirable first volume offers for the first time the complete text of the autobiographical papers left at his death by Cardinal Newman and since then checked and introduced by the unique scholarship of Father Tristram, the late archivist at the Birmingham Oratory. They have been availed of already by Newman’s chief biographers, Anne Mozley and Wilfred Ward, who cited much of them in their discreet works. Their faithful portrait is not likely to be revolutionized by publishing the whole collection; (...) yet a personal, nostalgic light is clearly cast upon the milestones of his life and thought, particularly in his university career. Newman always held that a perfect biography should allow its subject to speak for himself, preferably in the current letters which record currente calamo the daily judgments of his mental development. Official biography unconsciously bows to the retrospective theory of the biographer, which may import false emphasis and even distortion into the real history of his subject’s life and thought. Newman’s own comments, as a particularly complex individual in revolt against his own intellectual context, are specially valuable. All through his long life he carefully kept letters and made memoirs—his apostolate aimed, not at mass-communication but at personal exchange at private or collegiate level. Hence his pen was ever expressing his developing thought. During his thirty-eight years’ residence at Birmingham his collected papers were annually revised, a scrupulous task rendered more necessary by the death in 1872 of his biographer-designate, Ambrose St. John. Now sui ipsius interpres, the best witness and evaluator of the details of his work, he offers us in old age a final personal analysis of his memories. (shrink)

This admirable first volume offers for the first time the complete text of the autobiographical papers left at his death by Cardinal Newman and since then checked and introduced by the unique scholarship of Father Tristram, the late archivist at the Birmingham Oratory. They have been availed of already by Newman’s chief biographers, Anne Mozley and Wilfred Ward, who cited much of them in their discreet works. Their faithful portrait is not likely to be revolutionized by publishing the whole collection; (...) yet a personal, nostalgic light is clearly cast upon the milestones of his life and thought, particularly in his university career. Newman always held that a perfect biography should allow its subject to speak for himself, preferably in the current letters which record currente calamo the daily judgments of his mental development. Official biography unconsciously bows to the retrospective theory of the biographer, which may import false emphasis and even distortion into the real history of his subject’s life and thought. Newman’s own comments, as a particularly complex individual in revolt against his own intellectual context, are specially valuable. All through his long life he carefully kept letters and made memoirs—his apostolate aimed, not at mass-communication but at personal exchange at private or collegiate level. Hence his pen was ever expressing his developing thought. During his thirty-eight years’ residence at Birmingham his collected papers were annually revised, a scrupulous task rendered more necessary by the death in 1872 of his biographer-designate, Ambrose St. John. Now sui ipsius interpres, the best witness and evaluator of the details of his work, he offers us in old age a final personal analysis of his memories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There are only three surviving biographical notices regarding Marcus of Orvieto: two as colophons of Vatican manuscripts and a third as an entry in a catalog of the papal library in Avignon where we read: "Item, liber de mortalitatibus septem Martini de Urbevetani Ordinis Minorum." While the spelling of the book title and its author can be attributed to scribal errors or misreadings, the 'seven,' place of origin, and (...) religious order affiliation are accurate. Marcus's Liber de Moralitatibus is indeed divided into seven treatises: On the celestial bodies, On the elements, On the birds, On the fish, On the animals, On trees and plants and On precious gems. The colophons of the two Vatican manuscripts attest to his being a Friar Minor: Ego frater Marcus Urbis Veteris Fratrum Minorum Ordinis pauperculus. The prooemium of the Liber de Moralitatibus attests to the fact that Marcus's patron was Benedict Gaetani cardinal of St. Nicholas in carcere Tulliano,' the future pope Boniface VIII. This would put the time of composition circa 1290. Several allusions in Marcus's work to Paris, viz. the Parisian masters, its patron Ste. Genevieve, indicate that Marcus was at one time a student there and it is conceivable that Benedict commissioned the work while he was a papal legate there. Marcus's opus falls into the category of exempla literature, i.e. a source book for preachers.We offer the English translation of the chapter on pelicans as typical of Marcus's way of proceeding which, generally speaking, is threefold. First a physical description, which was generally copied from Bartholomew of England's 'On the Properties of Things,' secondly its spiritual signification attested to by pertinent passages from Scripture and bolstered by citations from the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and thirdly examples of persons who exemplify the spiritual lesson either supportively or adversely. The legend of the pelican piercing its breast in order to revivify its dead chicks was familiar in Christian literature and art signifying analogously Christ's salvific blood redeeming the human race from its fallen state. The following is the English translation of Marcus's treatise 3, 'De avibus,' chapter 31.Chapter 31: On the pelicanThe pelican is seen to possess the following conditions or properties according to the doctors.1. First of all, as Isidore says, it is a "bird dwelling in solitude along the banks of the Nile." This signifies preachers and contemplative persons who flee the vanities of the world and occupy themselves with heavenly consolations or delightful and re-creative consolations of Sacred Scripture, Psalm 54, 8-9: Far away I would flee; I would lodge in the wilderness. I would hasten to find shelter from the violent storm and the tempest. Bernard, On the Canticle of Canticles and in his sermons: "Divine consolation is delicate, it is not given to those preoccupied with what is alien to it." Ambrose, On Luke: "Those preoccupied with secular vanities cannot know what is divine."2. Secondly, as Isidore says, whatever it eats, it first dips in water with its foot and having done so, using the foot as a hand as it were, puts it [the morsel] in its mouth. This signifies doctors [i. e. teachers] and preachers who practice what they teach or preach after the example of the Apostle, Romans 15, 18: I will not dare to speak of anything except what Christ has accomplished through me. Jerome, To Nepotian: "Make sure your deeds do not 'confound' your words, lest when you speak in the assembly someone might say to himself: 'Physician, cure yourself'."3. Thirdly, as Isidore says, of all the birds, with the exception of the phylargum, only the pelican uses its foot as a hand. This signifies a devout religious who frequently, motivated by holy desires and affections, prefers holy meditations rather than manual labor. 1Tim. 4: 7-8: Train yourself for devotion, for while physical training is of.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:506 BOOK REVIEWS signified by bread and wine (39). Schoot sums up the concept of mysterium operative here by saying that it is "something hidden, voiced truly but inadequately, spiritually signified by the Old Testament and now fulfilled in Christ and the sacrament of the eucharist" (38). Despite the meticulous scholarship displayed in this work, students of Aquinas's theological epistemology and christology may well be struck by what seem (...) to be gratuitous harmonizations between theology and christology (the parallel between the analogy of being and the communicationem idiomatum, making the hypostatic union paradigmatic in the naming of God), the overwhelming weight given to the signification/supposition distinction, and the seeming reduction of the principles of christology to linguistic rules. In addition, the complex and often turgid style serves to obfuscate certain important questions, such as Aquinas's understanding of Christ's esse. Is Aquinas being forced into a theological mold that he himself would not recognize? Dominican School ofPhilosophy and Theology Berkeley, California EDWARD L. KRASEVAC, 0.P An Introduction to the History of Exegesis, vol. III: St. Augustine. By BERTRAND DE MARGERIE, S.J. Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1993. Pp. xi+ 169 (paper). Unfortunately, today many scholars and general readers neglect the work of the Fathers of the Church. One often hears that the writings of the Fathers have become less relevant or less important because there has been so much progress in Scripture studies and because the Fathers did not really try to find out what the inspired writer meant to say-for they relied on allegory. St. Augustine's exegesis poses a particular difficulty in terms of its reliance on allegory. Augustine was strongly influenced by the allegorical exegesis of bishop Ambrose and recounts in his Confession.5 (VI, iv, 6) how he used to hear Ambrose teaching in his sermons, as though he were most diligently teaching a rule: "The letter kills, but the spirit gives life." Father de Margerie admits that Augustine did indeed suffer from "excessive allegorism" (126), but he insists that this is no reason to give up entirely on Augustine. Instead, with keen scholarly analysis he shows that, in spite of some defects, Augustine did in fact give us some really fine work in Scripture study. Father de Margerie stresses that according to Augustine the purpose of all Scripture is to teach love: "... the plenitude and the end of the Law and of BOOK REVIEWS 507 all the sacred Scriptures is the love... of a Being which is to be enjoyed and of a being that can share that enjoyment with us" (20; from De Doctrina Christiana, I, xxv, 39). This love is taught even at the beginning of Scripture: "... on a subjective level, Moses wrote for the love of all men" (30). But how could this be? "It seems to us nowadays that Augustine failed to perceive adequately the progressive nature of the disclosure of religious truths by the God who revealed them" (30). Father de Margerie responds to this objection by pointing out that given the belief that Moses had been given a transient, "face to face vision of the Divine being... and that this experience was granted him precisely in favor of the universal Church," it makes sense to assume that "the prophet and maker of the old Law received knowledge, during this vision and through divine revelation, of how future interpretation of the Law he was issuing-like that which Jesus was to issuewould extend even to enemies the love of one's neighbor" (31). Augustine was led to this view in the light of the varied interpretations being proposed in his own time for Genesis (48). Father de Margerie admits that "Augustine himself limits the scope of his theory concerning the plurality of literal meaning to a few rather exceptional verses of scripture" (65). Augustine believed, however, that Moses had received most remarkable gifts: I cannot think that Moses Your most faithful servant was given by you lesser gifts than I should have wished and longed to have for myself if I had been born at the same time as he.... I should have wished that you would grant me such a skill in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law by Christopher J. InsoleChris L. FirestoneChristopher J. Insole. Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. v + 409. Hardback, $110.00.The extent to which the philosophy of Immanuel Kant converges with or diverges from Christian thought has been a hotly debated topic in recent years. Central to that debate has been the (...) resurgence of interest in Kant's classic Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (henceforth, Religion). The most insightful interpretations and applications of Religion, it seems, have utilized resources from a broad range of Kant's writings, emphasizing his philosophy considered as an integrated whole. Christopher Insole's recent monograph—Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law—attempts to redirect this debate with an argument spanning Kant's precritical and critical periods in performing a deep dive on the topic of freedom. On the face of it, the argument is not purely theological or even religious. It revolves, instead, around a metaphysical analysis of freedom, both as exemplified in Kant's writings and relative to his historical predecessors.Key to Insole's proposal is that Kant's critical notion of freedom evolves into something very different than that of his predecessors (on which his early writings depend) and, in its development, decisively "ruptures" with the Christian tradition. Human freedom, on Insole's analysis of Kant, must be "end-setting" and not constrained or directed by any type of external compulsion. This suggests that God cannot be understood to influence freedom causally, or at least not without human conscious and free consent. Numerous writers have thought they spied Christian connections in Kant's notion of freedom, such as the need for divine forgiveness, and even grace, to avoid the absurdum practicum. Insole resists all such attempts as being foreign to the novelty of the mature Kant's reflections on freedom. No external force can be brought to bear as a determining causal influence on human freedom, presumably because an end set before us from outside undermines our ability to set an end for ourselves. God is at best the "all-knowing distributor of happiness" (321) that makes end-setting and the kingdom of ends worthwhile moral pursuits. Insole's express intention is to "show the significance of Kant's denial that God can be our final cause" and that "his philosophical religiosity, understood on its own terms, and as expressed across his whole oeuvre" shows that "Kant cannot easily be called a Christian thinker" at all (2–4).Extricating Kant from Christianity proves to be a monumental task. Insole uses eighteen chapters and more than four hundred pages to make his case. The argument distinguishes itself from other such attempts in its rigorous analytic approach to unpacking the metaphysical underpinnings of issues supposedly at the root of Kant's philosophical theology. The book presents a cumulative case argument for Kant's supposed break with "the Christian theological tradition as he would have received it" (13). Much rests on whether or not this argument is cogent. Kant, according to Insole, is something akin to a theological Platonist and moral Stoic, who attempts to establish a unique form of "philosophical religiosity" (3 and 156). This makes Kant similar to the likes of Augustine and Ambrose, but different in terms of his theological aspirations. Insole casts Kant not as a pure philosopher seeking to understand philosophy relative to the Christian tradition, but rather as a philosophical [End Page 164] theologian bent on showing human freedom, free end-setting, and an ethical community of end-setters to be the exclusive means for attaining the highest good. Although this may sound Pelagian, Insole insists it is not, because "the Pelagian could still regard God as our final cause and efficient cause" (299). In other words, in Insole's interpretation, Kant is a strict philosophical humanist or what theologians might term a hyper-Pelagian.The difficult details of Insole's arguments are important to consider but not easily dealt with in the space provided here. Early in the book, Insole takes his reader on a metaphysical tour of "Divine Ideas" and "God... (shrink)

S. Adams, W. Ambrose, A. Andretta, H. Becker, R. Camerlo, C. Champetier, J.P.R. Christensen, D.E. Cohen, A. Connes. C. Dellacherie, R. Dougherty, R.H. Farrell, F. Feldman, A. Furman, D. Gaboriau, S. Gao, V. Ya. Golodets, P. Hahn, P. de la Harpe, G. Hjorth, S. Jackson, S. Kahane, A.S. Kechris, A. Louveau,, R. Lyons, P.-A. Meyer, C.C. Moore, M.G. Nadkarni, C. Nebbia, A.L.T. Patterson, U. Krengel, A.J. Kuntz, J.-P. Serre, S.D. Sinel'shchikov, T. Slaman, Solecki, R. Spatzier, J. Steel, D. Sullivan, (...) S. Thomas, A. Valette, V.S. Varadarajan, B. Velickovic, B. Weiss, J.D.M. Wright, R.J. Zimmer. (shrink)

Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.

Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained (...) and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. This book should be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)